Threats to burn a school. Can you get into trouble?
Specifically, the child's act could be prosecuted under Fla. Stat. § 836.10, which criminalizes sending, posting, or transmitting written or electronic threats Fla. Stat. § 836.10, Grigoriou v. State, 400 So. 3d 16. While the child may assert that the statement was merely a joke, this defense depends on whether the communication constitutes a "true threat" and whether the child possessed the requisite subjective intent Dominguez v. State, 432 So. 3d 1192.
Criminal Liability
Fla. Stat. § 836.10(2) makes it a second-degree felony to send, post, or transmit an "electronic record"—including a social media post—in any manner in which it may be viewed by another person, when the record contains a threat to commit an act of terrorism or to kill or do bodily harm to another person Fla. Stat. § 836.10. A threat to burn down a school, depending on context, can be analyzed as a threat to conduct an act of terrorism or to do bodily harm Fla. Stat. § 836.10.
Definition of an Electronic Record: An "electronic record" is defined as any record created, modified, archived, received, or distributed electronically containing any combination of text, graphics, video, audio, or pictorial representation in digital form Fla. Stat. § 836.10. Social media posts fall squarely within this definition Grigoriou v. State, 400 So. 3d 16, B.W.B. v. State, 374 So. 3d 40.
Juvenile Justice Posture: Because the actor is a child, the state may initiate delinquency proceedings under Chapter 985 of the Florida Statutes rather than adult criminal prosecution Fla. Stat. § 985.556, Fla. Stat. § 985.565, J.A.W. v. State, 283 So. 3d 896. A juvenile court handles disposition primarily to rehabilitate the child, whereas adult sentencing focuses primarily on punishment J.B.S. v. State, 90 So. 3d 961. However, the state attorney may seek to transfer a child who is 14 years of age or older for prosecution as an adult under certain statutory criteria, including the seriousness of the offense and the protection of the public Fla. Stat. § 985.556, Fla. Stat. § 985.565.
The Jest Defense and the "True Threat" Standard
The primary defense to a prosecution under Fla. Stat. § 836.10 is that the statement was not a "true threat" but was instead protected expression, such as a joke, jest, or hyperbole Dominguez v. State, 432 So. 3d 1192.
First Amendment protections do not extend to "true threats" Dominguez v. State, 432 So. 3d 1192, B.W.B. v. State, 374 So. 3d 40, Romero v. State, 314 So. 3d 699. Under Florida law, a "true threat" is a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals Dominguez v. State, 432 So. 3d 1192, Romero v. State, 314 So. 3d 699. To determine whether a statement constitutes a threat under Fla. Stat. § 836.10, Florida courts apply an objective assessment: whether the written communication was "sufficient to cause alarm in reasonable persons" T.R.W. v. State, 363 So. 3d 1081. Under this objective standard, "remarks made in jest or mere puffery, political hyperbole, or involuntary communications" are distinguished from true threats Dominguez v. State, 432 So. 3d 1192.
The Subjective Intent (Mens Rea) Requirement
To support a conviction under Fla. Stat. § 836.10, the state must prove two separate intent-related requirements:
Existence of a True Threat: The statement must objectively be a true threat Dominguez v. State, 432 So. 3d 1192. (objectively)
Subjective Mens Rea: The defendant must have actually intended that the statement be a true threat Dominguez v. State, 432 So. 3d 1192. (Defendant’s state of mind).
Florida's district courts of appeal have historically debated the mens rea requirement. The Fifth District “previously held” that Fla. Stat. § 836.10 did not require the actual intent to do harm or the ability to carry out the threat Dominguez v. State, 432 So. 3d 1192. However, the Second, Third, and Fourth Districts have held that Fla. Stat. § 836.10 does include a subjective mens rea element, requiring proof of scienter to protect lawful, constitutionally protected speech Dominguez v. State, 432 So. 3d 1192, T.R.W. v. State, 363 So. 3d 1081. To satisfy this element, the state must prove that the speaker meant to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence Dominguez v. State, 432 So. 3d 1192, Romero v. State, 314 So. 3d 699. The state is not, however, required to prove that the child actually intended to carry out the threat of burning down the school, as the statute protects individuals from the fear of violence and the disruption that such fear causes Romero v. State, 314 So. 3d 699.
If a child makes a statement strictly in jest with no subjective intent to threaten, and the context demonstrates that a reasonable person would not find the message "sufficient to cause alarm," the "jest" defense will defeat the state's case because the state cannot establish the required mens rea or the existence of a true threat Dominguez v. State, 432 So. 3d 1192, T.R.W. v. State, 363 So. 3d 1081. [[[[[However, if the context indicates a reasonable person would feel alarmed, and the court finds the child intended to make a true threat, the "jest" defense will fail Dominguez v. State, 432 So. 3d 1192, B.W.B. v. State, 374 So. 3d 40.
Distinguishing Bomb Scares and Firearm Hoaxes
It is critical to distinguish § 836.10 from Florida's "bomb scare hoax" statute, Fla. Stat. § 790.163(1) criminalizes making a false report, with the intent to deceive, mislead, or misinform, concerning the placing or planting of a bomb or explosive, or concerning the violent use of firearms against a person J.A.W. v. State, 283 So. 3d 896, Fla. Stat. § 790.163, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Petitioner, vs. D. H., Respondent., 2009 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 1093, Case No. 08-5641.
A threat to "burn a school down" does not fall under Fla. Stat. § 790.163 unless the threat specifically concerns the placing or planting of a bomb, dynamite, other deadly explosive, weapon of mass destruction, or the violent use of firearms J.A.W. v. State, 283 So. 3d 896, Fla. Stat. § 790.163. For example, when a juvenile made a bad April Fools' Day joke saying "I'm going to shoot up the classroom, April Fools," the court evaluated the statement under Fla. Stat. § 790.163(1) as a false report concerning the use of firearms, though it ultimately reversed the adjudication because the statute did not criminalize that specific type of classroom statement J.A.W. v. State, 283 So. 3d 896.
Qualifications and Limitations
The viability of the "jest" defense depends heavily on the specific facts and context of the social media post. Elements such as accompanying images (e.g., holding weapons or wearing tactical gear), the platform used, the child's school history, and the presence of personal notebooks or secondary evidence of violent thoughts will be used by courts to determine if the post was a joke or a true threat B.W.B. v. State, 374 So. 3d 40.
Furthermore, even if the child avoids criminal or delinquency adjudication, school boards maintain independent authority under local codes of student conduct to impose administrative discipline, such as suspension or expulsion, for disruptive threats J.A.W. v. State, 283 So. 3d 896, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Petitioner, vs. D. H., Respondent., 2009 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 1093, Case No. 08-5641.
In conclusion, a child's social media post threatening to burn down a school is a second-degree felony under Florida Statutes § 836.10. While the child can argue the statement was made in jest as a defense, this defense is only successful if the context shows the statement was not objectively a true threat or that the child lacked the subjective intent to make a true threat. Under Florida law, the state does not need to prove the child actually intended to burn down the school, only that the child intended to post a statement that a reasonable person would find alarming. Depending on the child's age and history, the case may proceed through juvenile delinquency channels or be transferred to adult court.
Sources
Codes | Florida
Cases | Florida | Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District | Jan 8, 2025
Cases | Florida | Court of Appeal of Florida, First District | Mar 18, 2026
Cases | Florida | Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District | Nov 15, 2023
Codes | Florida
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